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Regulations in Alcohol Advertising: 
Scrutiny Applied to Commercial 
Speech 
John M. Middleton 
ABSTRACT 
There is a circuit split between the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth 
circuits concerning the level of scrutiny to apply to the regulation of alcohol adver-
tising. The regulatory framework for the alcohol industry has a long and evolving 
history. Since our country’s founding, alcohol has had a strong presence in Ameri-
can life, and it continues to enjoy a flourishing market. Knowing the alcohol indus-
try’s history is important to understanding the current circuit split. The Twenty-First 
Amendment repealed Prohibition and gave states the power to regulate alcohol ac-
cording to their own standards. The protections granted by the First Amendment 
have also evolved over time, especially concerning commercial speech within the 
alcohol industry. 
 
Missouri and California both effectively prohibited alcohol manufacturers and dis-
tributors from financially investing in alcohol retail businesses. These regulatory 
schemes were challenged in federal court for violating the Free Speech Clause of 
the First Amendment, resulting in a circuit split between the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. In 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held in Retail Digital Network v. Prieto that California’s regulation banning 
manufacturers from running advertisements with alcohol retail stores was constitu-
tional and not an infringement of protected commercial speech. In 2020, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in Missouri Broadcasters Association 
v. Schmitt that Missouri’s statute banning alcohol manufacturers from advertising 
for retailers was unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment. 
 
Both laws were similar in that they restricted advertising within the alcohol indus-
try. The different outcomes resulted from a different standard of scrutiny being ap-
plied by each circuit. The Ninth Circuit applied the traditional Central Hudson four-
part test, the standard evaluation for commercial speech regulations. The Eighth 
Circuit still evaluated the restriction using the Central Hudson test, but applied a 
higher level of scrutiny derived from the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Sorrell 
v. IMS Health Inc. 
 
 
 John Middleton is a second-year student at the University of Missouri School of Law and an Associate 
Member of the Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review. He graduated with a degree in Interna-
tional Studies from the University of Missouri in 2015 and then spent three years in Washington, D.C., 
working as a Legislative Aide before starting law school in 2019. Special thanks to Dean Lyrissa Lidsky 
for her support and First Amendment expertise throughout the writing process. 
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This article examines whether Sorrell created a new standard for evaluating com-
mercial speech restrictions, and if so, how it should be applied within the alcohol 
industry. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Development of the Three-Tier System to Regulate the Alcohol Industry 
The United States Congress ratified the Eighteenth Amendment, which prohib-
ited the manufacture, sale, and transportation of alcohol from 1919 to 1933 – com-
monly known as Prohibition.1 Congress passed this amendment to prevent the crime 
and corruption associated with intoxicating liquors.2 Proponents of Prohibition were 
persuaded that alcohol consumption was leading to an unsavory culture in Amer-
ica.3 In response to Prohibition, bootleggers and other criminal enterprises began 
stealing and selling alcohol.4 
The Twenty-First Amendment was ratified in 1933 and repealed the entirety of 
the Eighteenth Amendment.5 States were fearful that criminal syndicates would 
continue to dominate the alcohol industry after Prohibition, which led them to suc-
cessfully lobby Congress to include a clause allowing states to regulate alcohol en-
tering their territories.6 Article Two of the Twenty-First Amendment granted states 
the power to control the transportation of alcohol within their borders.7 
Following the end of Prohibition, states quickly developed regulatory frame-
works for the alcohol industry,8 which included the creation of three-tier and tied-
house systems to curtail the influence of powerful alcohol manufacturers over less-
powerful retailers.9 Under the traditional three-tier system, the interests of produc-
ers, wholesalers, and retailers are all separated.10 Each level must obtain a different 
type of license to sell. Manufacturers are only licensed to sell to wholesalers or 
distributors, wholesalers are only licensed to sell to retailers, and retailers are only 
licensed to sell to consumers.11 Except for codified exceptions, each tier must stay 
within its lane and not conduct the business limited to other levels.12 For example, 
a producer like Anheuser-Busch cannot sell their product directly to a bar or liquor 
store.13 Similarly, tied-house laws generally prevent owners of businesses in one 
tier from investing in a business in a different tier.14 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. 
 2. See Mark Thorton, Alcohol Prohibition Was a Failure, CATO INSTITUTE (July 17, 1991), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/alcohol-prohibition-was-failure. 
 3. Temperance & Prohibition: Why Prohibition, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, https://prohibi-
tion.osu.edu/why-prohibition (last visited April 30, 2021). 
 4. See Amy Murphy, Discarding the North Dakota Dictum: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of the 
Three-tier Distribution System, 110 MICH. L. REV. 819, 820 (2012). 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2; see also Murphy, supra note 2, at 821. 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. 
 8. See Barbara C. Beliveau & M. Elizabeth Rouse, Prohibition and Repeal: A Short History of the 
Wine Industry’s Regulation in the United States, 5 J. WINE ECON. 53, 57 (2010). 
 9. Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 2020). 
 10. Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 843 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 11. Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2457 (2019). 
 12. See Beliveau, supra note 8, at 57. 
 13. See Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449. 
 14. See generally id. (explaining that a corporation has residency restrictions that limit their ability to 
get a retail license which, practically, means that no publicly traded corporation may operate a liquor 
store in their respective state.) 
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II. COMMERCIAL SPEECH STANDARD 
A. The Central Hudson Test 
Commercial speech, or advertising, is “expression related solely to the eco-
nomic interests of the speaker and its audience.”15 Until 45 years ago, commercial 
speech did not receive First Amendment protection.16 In 1975, the Supreme Court 
decided in Bigelow v. Virginia that commercial advertisements are protected under 
the First Amendment’s free speech clause.17 The Court went even further one year 
later in Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., holding that commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment because 
truthful advertising is in the people’s interest.18 Many questions concerning the 
scope of First Amendment protections of commercial speech protections were left 
unanswered following these cases.19 Chief among these questions was which level 
of scrutiny should be applied to commercial speech.20 The Supreme Court answered 
many of those questions with Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission of New York in 1980.21 
In Central Hudson, the New York Public Service Commission banned a power 
company’s advertisements that contained truthful information and were intended to 
increase sales.22 The Court had to evaluate the constitutionality of that speech re-
striction. In doing so, the Court held that commercial speech is afforded less pro-
tection than political, artistic, or other core speech, but is still shielded by the First 
Amendment.23 Advertising to make profits is a form of speech and is protected 
against unwarranted regulation.24 
Central Hudson provided the framework for the modern test that courts apply 
to determine whether government regulations go too far in restricting commercial 
speech.25 The test consists of four elements: (1) commercial speech must not be 
misleading and must concern lawful activity, (2) the governmental interest asserted 
must be substantial, (3) the governmental interest asserted is directly advanced by 
the regulation, and (4) the regulation “is not more extensive than is necessary to 
serve that interest.”26 The final three elements will not be considered if the first 
element is not met.27 
 
 15. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 
561 (1980). 
 16. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Christina E. Wells, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Caroline Mala Corbin, THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND THEORY 303 (3rd ed. 2017). 
 17. 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975). 
 18. 425 U.S. 748, 772-73 (1976). 
 19. See Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Peril of Parity, 25 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J 
965, 968 (2017). 
 20. See id. 
 21. 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Schauer, supra note 19. 
 22. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 559. 
 23. Id. at 562; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455 (1978). 
 24. Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 
(1976). 
 25. Krotoszynski, supra note 16. 
 26. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564-66. 
 27. See Schauer, supra note 19, at 973-74. 
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Effectively, the Central Hudson test only applies to lawful commercial speech 
that is not misleading.28 The Court held that the government’s power to regulate 
speech is lessened when the speech is truthful and concerns legal activity.29 The test 
weighs governmental interests against free speech interests to determine if regula-
tions are warranted. 
The first element was easily met in Central Hudson due to the Commission not 
claiming that the challenged advertising was either illegal or misleading.30 But, the 
Commission did argue that the advertising was not a form of protected speech be-
cause the speech was not worth anything due to Central Hudson being an electrical 
utility company, and thus having a monopoly in the area.31 The Court did not see 
any merit in that argument since the advertising still provided useful information to 
consumers.32 
Next, the Commission had to prove that its interests in banning the advertise-
ments were substantial.33 The Commission stated two interests: (1) conserving en-
ergy during the fuel shortage, and (2) keeping a fair market with efficient rates.34 
The Court easily concluded that this second element was also met, in that conserv-
ing energy during a crisis and keeping fair rates for electricity were both substantial 
interests.35 
The Court then analyzed whether the advertising ban directly advanced each 
asserted interests.36 The point of advertising is to increase sales, so the Court easily 
found the connection between energy consumption and advertising.37 However, the 
Court concluded the stated interest of fair markets was too speculative.38 There were 
too many other factors to account for that could contribute to an unfair market be-
sides advertising.39 
The final element of the test prevents the government from broadly restricting 
speech. The government cannot entirely suppress information when a narrower re-
striction would serve the stated interest.40 In Central Hudson, New York faced an 
energy crisis due to a shortage in fuel stock reserves.41 Advertisements for the utility 
company went against the policy concerns of New York because they encouraged 
increased energy consumption.42 Nevertheless, the Court applied the “intermediate 
scrutiny”43 test to the restriction and determined the complete advertising ban was 
unconstitutional because a more limited regulation could have served the state’s 
interest.44 
 
 28. See id. 
 29. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980). 
 30. See id. at 566-67. 
 31. Id. at 567. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. at 566. 
 34. See id. at 568-69. 
 35. Id. at 568. 
 36. Id. at 568-69. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. at 569. 
 39. Id. at 569. 
 40. Id. at 565. 
 41. Id. at 559. 
 42. See Lora E. Barnhart Driscoll, Citizens United v. Central Hudson: A Rationale for Simplifying 
And Clarifying the First Amendment’s Protections for Nonpolitical Advertisements, 19 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 213, 218 (2011). 
 43. See id. at 219. 
 44. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 571 (1980). 
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B. Heightened Level of Scrutiny with Sorrel 
The Central Hudson four-element test remained the standard for thirty years.45 
Commercial speech earned another level of protection in 2011, following Sorrell v. 
IMS Health Inc.46 Vermont imposed a law on pharmacies that restricted them from 
disclosing information on doctors’ prescribing practices for marketing purposes.47 
This regulation restricted speech of certain speakers (pharmacies) and only re-
stricted certain content (doctors’ prescribing practices).48 Therefore, the ban was a 
content and speaker-based burden on speech.49 
The Sorrell Court stated that it would not make a difference whether the new 
“heightened standard” or the traditional intermediate standard was applied.50 For 
that reason, the Court applied the traditional Central Hudson intermediate test be-
cause the outcome would be the same either way.51 Still, the Court held that height-
ened scrutiny is the correct standard when the government imposes content and 
speaker-based restrictions on commercial speech.52 Additionally, the Sorrell Court 
reiterated one of their previous holdings from Ward v. Rock Against Racism that 
heightened scrutiny applies when the government restricts speech because the gov-
ernment disagrees with the message being conveyed.53 
A comprehensive reading of the Sorrell opinion shows that the Supreme Court 
believed a more exacting level of scrutiny is deserved for evaluating commercial 
speech regulations than the intermediate scrutiny derived from Central Hudson.54 
In deciding Sorrell, the Court mentions the term “heightened” ten times in the ma-
jority opinion, without ever clearly explaining what “heightened” means.55 The 
Court uses different phrasing when applying the four-part test.56  
The Court has gradually increased the protections to commercial speech in the 
past forty years. In 1974, First Amendment protections for commercial speech were 
practically non-existent.57 Then in 1975, with Bigelow, the Supreme Court opined 
that the free speech clause does extend to advertising.58 With Central Hudson in 
1980, the Court provided a framework for evaluating restrictions on commercial 
speech and held that government interests must be substantially furthered by the 
speech restriction – known as intermediate scrutiny.59 Taking the new heightened 
scrutiny from Sorrell into account, this movement from the Supreme Court of 
 
 45. See Nat Stern & Mark Joseph Stern, Advancing an Adaptive Standard of Strict Scrutiny for Con-
tent -Based Commercial Speech Regulation, 47 UNIV. RICH. L. REV. 1171, 1184 (2013). 
 46. See 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 47. Id. at 557. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. at 557-58. 
 50. See generally id. at 571 (explaining that the case could be resolved even if the information was a 
mere commodity.) 
 51. See id. at 571-72. 
 52. Id. at 566. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Stern, supra note 45, at 1171. 
 55. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 56. Infra Part IV, Section B. 
 57. Krotoszynski, supra note 16. 
 58. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975). 
 59. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
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promoting protections for commercial speech shows a trend of “anti-paternalism” 
regarding speech restrictions and a tendency to favor the marketplace of ideas.60 
III. SPEECH RESTRICTIONS ON THE ALCOHOL INDUSTRY 
A. History on Alcohol Advertising 
Pursuant to the Twenty-First Amendment, many states enacted robust regula-
tory schemes to control the alcohol industry.61 States also interpreted the Twenty-
First Amendment to shield their regulations from First Amendment protections.62 
The Supreme Court held in 44 Liquormart that the Twenty-First Amendment does 
not give states the license to ignore other provisions in the Constitution, like the 
Free Speech Clause.63 This was an important holding that informed states they can-
not enact burdensome commercial speech restrictions on alcohol advertising under 
the guise of the Twenty-First Amendment. 
Tied-house laws that many states enacted post-Prohibition prevent the three 
separate tiers of manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers from financially investing 
in different levels of the tier system.64 This includes advertising; a manufacturer or 
wholesaler cannot advertise for a retailer.65 For example, Anheuser-Busch cannot 
pay for a roadside billboard that says, “Great priced Budweiser bottles at QuikTrip 
convenience stores.” Many states, however, have codified exceptions for mi-
crobreweries that allow small breweries to sell alcohol on their premises and adver-
tise for themselves.66 
B. 8th Circuit - Missouri Broadcasters Association 
Like many other states, Missouri adopted a three-tier system to regulate its al-
cohol industry.67 These regulations are collectively known as “tied-house” laws.68 
Missouri’s statute regulating alcohol includes a provision strictly prohibiting 
wholesalers and distributors from having any financial interest in “the retail busi-
ness for sale of intoxicating liquors.”69 Missouri categorizes retail advertising as a 
financial interest and prohibits wholesalers and distributors from advertising for re-
tail liquor businesses.70 Missouri does allow exceptions to this general ban. Produc-
ers and distributors can advertise for retailers if they list more than one business in 
the advertisement and the advertisement does not list the price of the alcoholic prod-
uct.71 
 
 60. Stern, supra note 45, at 1187. 
 61. See discussion supra Part I, Section A. 
 62. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996). 
 63. Id. at 516. 
 64. See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 843 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 65. See e.g., Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 2020); 
Retail Digital Network, 861 F. 3d at 843. 
 66. See e.g., MT. CODE ANN. § 16-3-213 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 311.195 (2016). 
 67. MO. REV. STAT. § 311.010-.950 (2016). 
 68. Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 2020). 
 69. MO. REV. STAT. § 311.070.1 (2020). 
 70. Missouri Broadcasters, 946 U.S. at 457. 
 71. MO. REV. STAT. § 311.070.4(10). 
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Missouri has an additional regulation prohibiting retailers from advertising dis-
counted drinks outside their establishment.72 Under this regulation, it would be il-
legal for a bar to advertise that they have “$1 bottles of beer on Mondays,” or for a 
liquor store to advertise a 12-pack of beer for $5. Retailers are allowed to advertise 
these discounts inside of their establishments.73 It is not illegal to sell discounted 
alcohol, just to advertise it to the public. 
The Missouri Broadcasters Association brought a suit challenging the statute 
and regulations discussed above that restrict alcohol advertising.74 After the case 
was initially dismissed in federal district court, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth District reversed that decision and sent it back to trial.75 Missouri 
Broadcasters then earned a judgment in their favor with a two-day bench trial. The 
state appealed on the following grounds: “(1) the Statute does not implicate the First 
Amendment, (2) even if the statute implicates the First Amendment, it passes the 
Central Hudson test for commercial speech and subsection 4(10) does not compel 
speech, and (3) the Regulations are also constitutional under Central Hudson.”76 
The three-judge panel at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected 
the state’s arguments and affirmed the trial court’s decision that Missouri’s adver-
tising regulations violate the First Amendment.77 
Relying on Sorrell and 44 Liquormart, the court determined that the challenged 
statute implicates the First Amendment.78 The statute “imposes a burden based on 
the content of speech and the identity of the speaker” by limiting the advertisements 
producers and distributors can run.79 Missouri’s argument that the statute’s sole pur-
pose was to regulate economic activity fell flat with the court, because its “practical 
operation” did impose a speech-based burden.80 Relying on 44 Liquormart, the 
court opined that the Twenty-First Amendment does not allow the state to infringe 
upon the rights granted by the First Amendment.81 
The court then evaluated the statute using the Central Hudson test. Both parties 
agreed that the first element was met, in that the statute concerned lawful and non-
misleading speech.82 The court implied that the second element was also met, as 
keeping an “orderly marketplace” – preventing alcohol retailers from being unduly 
influenced by more powerful distributors and manufacturers – was a substantial in-
terest.83 Missouri stated their liquor control laws were intended “to promote respon-
sible consumption, combat illegal underage drinking, and … [maintain] an orderly 
marketplace composed of state-licensed alcohol producers, importers, distributors, 
and retailers.”84 
 
 72. See MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 11 § 70-2.240(5)(I) (2019). 
 73. See generally id. (indicating that the regulation prevents only advertisement, not specifically pre-
venting sales.) 
 74. Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 458 (8th Cir. 2020). 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. at 463. 
 77. Id. at 463. 
 78. Id. at 459. 
 79. Id. (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011)). 
 80. Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 459 (8th Cir. 2020). 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. at 60. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 457. 
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Next, Missouri needed to show that the statute banning inter-tier retail adver-
tising directly advanced its substantial interest.85 The court relied on 44 Liquormart 
in requiring Missouri to prove that their statute advanced the state’s interest – pre-
venting undue influence – in a significant way.86 Missouri pointed to a consensus 
among other states that tied-house laws are necessary to reduce the undue influ-
ence.87 The court found the argument unpersuasive since Missouri did not address 
how its statute specifically impacts Missouri or if it was needed to stop undue in-
fluence.88 The court also found the number of exemptions in the statute rendered it 
ineffective.89 In particular, it is nearly impossible for the statute to prevent undue 
influence, because although producers cannot advertise products with a retailer’s 
name on the advertisement, they can supply retailers with generic product adver-
tisements.90 This discrepancy makes it nearly impossible for the statute to prevent 
undue influence. 
Even though Missouri failed to meet the third element, the court continued to 
evaluate whether the statute met the fourth element of not being more extensive 
than necessary to serve the stated interest.91 The Eighth Circuit took the Sorrell 
approach by putting the burden on Missouri to show that the restriction was not 
overburdensome, and determined that the restriction on speech was more extensive 
than necessary because Missouri did not offer proof to the contrary.92 The court 
listed alternative methods that Missouri could have employed to meet its stated in-
terest.93 Policing the three-tier system, removing the exemptions, monitoring the 
advertising of manufacturers, or creating self-reporting mechanisms were all possi-
ble alternatives according to the court.94 
The Eighth Circuit also found the regulations that restrict advertising of dis-
counted prices failed to meet the third and fourth elements of Central Hudson.95 As 
with the statute, Missouri failed to provide any empirical evidence or expert opin-
ions that demonstrated the regulations further the state’s interest.96 
The Eighth Circuit applied the heightened scrutiny discussed in Sorrell to eval-
uate the speech restriction using the Central Hudson four-part test. The court put 
the burden on the government to prove that the restriction does further a substantial 
state interest and the restriction was created with that goal in mind.97 
C. Ninth Circuit - Retail Digital Network 
Like Missouri, California has adopted the traditional three-tier system to regu-
late the alcohol industry.98 This method separates the interests of manufacturers, 
 
 85. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
 86. Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 460 (8th Cir. 2020). 
 87. Id. at 461. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 462. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 463. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. at 458. 
 98. See California Beer Wholesalers Assn., v. Alcoholic Bev. Etc. Appeals Bd., 487 P.2d 745, 748 
(Cal. 1971). 
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distributors, and retailers.99 California enacted these laws to combat the threat of 
large firms dominating small local markets and “overly aggressive marketing tech-
niques.”100 
California prohibits manufacturers and wholesalers from financially investing 
in alcohol retail businesses.101 This ban prohibits manufacturers from “providing 
anything of value to retailers in exchange for advertising their alcohol products.”102 
Retail Digital Network (“RDN”) operates a business in California that installs 
advertising displays in different types of retail stores,103 which includes the opera-
tion of digital screen displays in multiple liquor stores throughout the state.104 RDN 
contracted with companies to run their ads and then shared those profits with the 
retail stores.105 RDN entered into an agreement with St-Germain and Moët Hen-
nessy, two alcohol manufacturers, to run advertisements for them in retail stores.106 
The two manufacturers quickly exited the agreement due to the California re-
striction discussed above.107 Additionally, seven other alcohol manufacturers re-
fused to do business with RDN because they feared the California Alcohol Bever-
age Control department would enforce the regulation against them.108 
RDN filed a lawsuit in federal court contending that the advertising restriction 
violated the First Amendment and damaged their business. The District Court for 
the Central District of California granted summary judgment to the State of Cali-
fornia, relying on Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh.109 In Actmedia, the court held that Cali-
fornia’s code addressed a valid state interest and is therefore constitutional.110 A 
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s ruling and held 
that the Sorrell standard should have been applied.111 Rehearing this case en banc, 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that Actmedia applied and the 
regulation did not violate the First Amendment.112 
The court reexamined the facts from Actmedia to evaluate the constitutionality 
of speech restrictions in California’s liquor control laws.113 The Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the first two elements of the Central Hudson test were met.114 There was 
no debate on the fact that RDN’s advertisements were legal and not misleading. The 
Twenty-First Amendment gave states the right to regulate alcohol within their bor-
ders as each state sees appropriate.115 California’s Twenty-First Amendment power 
and keeping an orderly marketplace were deemed substantial governmental inter-
ests, thus meeting the second element as well.116 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 843 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 101. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503 (2020). 
 102. Retail Digital Network, 861 F.3d at 841; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503(f)-(h) (2020). 
 103. Retail Digital Network, 861 F.3d at 842. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. 830 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1986); Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 842 (9th Cir. 
2017). 
 110. Actmedia, 830 F.2d at 967. 
 111. Retail Digital Network, 861 F.3d at 842. 
 112. Id. at 851. 
 113. Id. at 844; Actmedia, 830 F.2d at 957. 
 114. Retail Digital Network, at 844. 
 115. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. 
 116. Retail Digital Network, 861 F.3d at 844. 
9
Middleton: Regulations in Alcohol Advertising: Scrutiny Applied to Commercia
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
120 B.E.T.R. [Vol. 5 2021 
The court proceeded to determine whether the third element of the Central 
Hudson test was met. California’s goal with Section 25503(h) is to prevent powerful 
alcohol manufacturers from exerting undue influence over retailers.117 The court 
found that the regulation furthers that goal by preventing manufacturers and distrib-
utors from sidestepping the three-tier system with advertising payoffs to retailers.118 
The Ninth Circuit also concluded the fourth element was met. The court opined, 
without citing any empirical evidence, that it would be difficult for California to 
properly police illegal payoffs for alcohol advertising.119 With that conclusion, the 
court held the regulation is narrowly tailored to further the government’s interest of 
keeping an orderly marketplace with the three-tier system.120 
The court next analyzed whether the standard for protecting commercial speech 
is the same now as it was in 1986, when it decided Actmedia. RDN argued that the 
court should apply a higher level of scrutiny,121 referencing the Supreme Court’s 
phrase “heightened scrutiny” in their Sorrell opinion.122 The Ninth Circuit rejected 
this argument, deciding that RDN interpreted Sorrell too expansively and that the 
original Central Hudson evaluation still applies.123 The court found that Sorrell did 
not change the standard and that “heightened scrutiny” does not mean anything dif-
ferent than “intermediate scrutiny” when evaluating commercial speech re-
strictions.124 
The Ninth Circuit found that California’s liquor control law directly advances 
a governmental interest, and that the restriction is narrowly tailored to that inter-
est.125 With that finding, the court held that the law is constitutional and does not 
violate the First Amendment. 
IV. CIRCUIT SPLIT DISCUSSION 
A. Different Levels of Scrutiny Applied 
The Eight Circuit, with Missouri Broadcasters, and the Ninth Circuit, with Re-
tail Digital Network, heard two similar cases and reached different decisions. Mis-
souri and California both have laws that prohibit alcohol manufacturers and distrib-
utors from financially investing in retail businesses,126 and directly prohibit whole-
salers and distributors from advertising for retailers. Additionally, both laws – in 
their practical operation – restrict speech based on the content of the speech and the 
identity of the speaker. The Eighth Circuit ruled Missouri’s advertising restriction 
violated the First Amendment.127 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit held California’s 
regulation is constitutional.128 
 
 117. Id. at 845. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 846 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. at 848. 
 125. Id. at 851. 
 126. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503 (2020); MO. REV. STAT. § 311.010-.950 (2016). 
 127. Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 463 (8th Cir. 2020). 
 128. Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 853 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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Each Circuit applied a different level of scrutiny, leading to these two distinct 
holdings. The Ninth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny created by Central Hud-
son.129 Alternatively, the Eighth Circuit applied heightened scrutiny derived from 
Sorrell.130 
The Ninth Circuit’s en banc court determined that the Supreme Court did not 
create a new level of scrutiny with its Sorrell decision.131 According the Ninth Cir-
cuit, Sorrell did not fundamentally change how the Central Hudson four-part test is 
applied to commercial speech regulations.132 The Ninth Circuit opined that the Su-
preme Court only used the term “heightened scrutiny” to differentiate it from ra-
tional basis review and it is no different from intermediate scrutiny.133 Chief Judge 
Thomas dissented from the majority opinion, mainly because he believed Sorrell 
did alter the Central Hudson test, in that heightened scrutiny is more strict than 
intermediate.134 Judge Thomas drew this conclusion from the Supreme Court’s re-
peated use of the phrase “heightened scrutiny,” and added language restricting the 
use of post hoc rationalizations.135 
Interestingly, the three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit described their inter-
pretation of heightened scrutiny in RDN’s first appeal.136 The three-judge panel 
slightly amends the third and fourth elements of the Central Hudson test to raise the 
standard, making it more difficult to restrict speech.137 For the third element, the 
court required the state to show that the regulation furthers the government’s inter-
est in a “direct and material way.”138 The standard Central Hudson third element 
only requires that the regulation “directly advances the governmental interest.”139 
The standard test is a much lighter burden to meet, in that the government does not 
have to prove their interest has been materially advanced by the regulation.140 For 
the fourth element, the three-judge panel required a “fit between the legislature’s 
ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.”141 The original Central Hud-
son standard only requires the regulation to not be “more extensive than is necessary 
to serve that interest.”142 This means that the state cannot defend its speech ban with 
a post-hoc justification.143 The state’s substantial interest must be the reason for 
restricting the speech.144 
 
 129. See Daniel J. Croxwall, Cheers to Central Hudson: How Traditional Intermediate Scrutiny Helps 
Keep Independent Craft Beer Viable, 113 Nw. U. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 16 (2018). 
 130. Missouri Broadcasters, 946 F.3d at 463. 
 131. Retail Digital Network, 861 F.3d at 846. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 847. 
 134. See id. at 851 (Thomas, S. dissenting). 
 135. Id. at 851-52 (Thomas, S. dissenting). 
 136. See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638, 653-54 (2016). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995)). 
 139. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 
557, 566 (1980). 
 140. Compare Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638, 653-54 (2016) with Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. 
 141. Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638, 654 (2016). 
 142. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. 
 143. See generally Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 462 (8th Cir. 2020) 
(requiring a showing of some evidence indicating a narrow tailoring of the state’s interest, rather than 
just a blanket implication of speech.). 
 144. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. 
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Likewise, the Eighth Circuit used the same “direct and material” phrasing for 
the third element as the Ninth Circuit’s three-judge panel.145 That amendment to the 
third element adds an extra evidentiary burden for the government to meet: the state 
must provide factual evidence that the restriction has furthered the stated govern-
mental interest.146 The Eighth Circuit struck down Missouri’s regulation because 
the state did not provide any “empirical or statistical evidence, study, or expert opin-
ion” that proved the efficacy of the restriction.147 The Ninth Circuit’s en banc court 
deemed the third and fourth elements of Central Hudson met without any hard ev-
idence presented by the state of California.148 The only evidence required from Cal-
ifornia that their regulation directly advanced the stated governmental interest was 
their reasonable belief that such a law would reduce corruption in the alcohol in-
dustry.149 
The Eighth Circuit also elevated the standard for meeting the fourth element. 
In Missouri Broadcasters, the court did not allow Missouri to give a post hoc ra-
tionalization for their speech restriction.150 For the statute to be narrowly tailored, 
the Missouri legislature needed to carefully assess the burden on free speech and 
weigh that against their stated interest.151 
The Eighth and Ninth Circuit also evaluated alternative restrictions that do not 
restrict speech with different levels of scrutiny. The Eighth Circuit put the burden 
on the state to prove that the other alternatives would not work.152 Missouri and 
California both claimed that policing advertising agreements would be impossible, 
without providing any factual evidence.153 The Ninth Circuit accepted California’s 
claim without providing thoughtful analysis as to whether the alternative policing 
methods could be feasible.154 Conversely, the Eighth Circuit concluded, in the ab-
sence of contrary evidence from the state, that there are other policing methods 
available that would not restrict speech.155 
B. Sorrell is the Correct Standard 
Instead of relying on Sorrell, the en banc Ninth Circuit decided to rely on their 
own holding from the 1986 Actmedia case.156 As earlier referenced, the Court has 
been trending towards an “anti-paternalism” view in the last fifty years.157 Yet, the 
Ninth Circuit relied on a 30-year-old precedent, of their own court, rather than the 
more recent Sorrell decision issued by the Supreme Court in 2011.158 The Supreme 
Court expanded commercial speech protection in Sorrell by requiring that statutes 
 
 145. Missouri Broadcasters, 946 F.3d at 460. 
 146. See generally id. at 462 (concluding that the state of Missouri lacked sufficient evidence regarding 
furthering a state interest.) 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 850 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 149. See id. at 850; Actmedia Inc. v. Stroh, 830 F.2d 957, 967 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 150. See generally Missouri Broadcasters Association v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d 453, 462 (8th Cir. 2020) 
(requiring the State of Missouri to provide some evidence how its restriction was narrowly tailored). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id.  at 462; Actmedia, 830 F.2d at 967. 
 154. See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 845 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 155. Missouri Broadcasters, 946 F.3d at 462. 
 156. Retail Digital Network, at 861 F.3d 851. 
 157. See discussion supra Part II, Section B. 
 158. See Retail Digital Network, at 861 F.3d 851. 
12
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 5 [], Iss. 1, Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol5/iss1/11
No. 1] Regulations in Alcohol Advertising 123 
be “drawn to achieve” the stated interest and supported by evidence that the statute 
actually impacts the interest.159 For those reasons, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly re-
lied on their own precedent from Actmedia instead of adopting the more recent Su-
preme Court precedent. 
The Retail Digital Network three-judge panel correctly held that Sorrell modi-
fied the level of scrutiny applied to commercial speech regulation.160 Not only did 
the Supreme Court mention “heightened” ten times, the Court used different lan-
guage to describe the third and fourth elements of the Central Hudson test.161 Chief 
Judge Thomas was correct in his dissent when he argued the “most reasonable read-
ing of Sorrell” is that it did modify the Central Hudson test.162 Unfortunately, the 
en banc Ninth Circuit did not adopt the three-judge panel’s standard and instead 
applied the older evaluation in Actmedia. 
The Eighth Circuit decided in line with the modern trend the Supreme Court 
has set. The Eighth Circuit did not blindly accept Missouri’s argument that “undue 
influence” continues to pervert the alcohol industry.163 Missouri used the same 
method as California to assert that undue influence is a real harm: both states simply 
cited history and referenced other states’ tied-house laws.164 The Eighth Circuit ap-
plied the heightened third element to reject Missouri’s unsupported argument, 
whereas the Ninth Circuit required no evidence to deem California met the third 
element.165 
The Fourth Circuit has also adopted the Sorrell standard. In Educational Media 
Co. at Virginia Tech, Inc. v. Insley, the Fourth Circuit held that a Virginia alcohol 
advertising regulation did not meet the fourth element under Sorrell.166 In Insley, 
the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (“VABC”) prohibited college 
newspapers from printing alcohol advertisements.167 The court evaluated the con-
stitutionality of the regulation against Sorrell, and determined that the VABC reg-
ulation was more extensive than necessary to reduce underage drinking, therefore 
violating the First Amendment under the Central Hudson test.168 Other than the 
Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth circuits, alcohol advertisements have not come under ju-
dicial scrutiny post-Sorrell. As of now, the Ninth Circuit is alone in claiming that 
Sorrell did not alter the four-part Central Hudson test for evaluating commercial 
speech regulations.169 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Eighth and Ninth circuits saw almost identical cases and reached different 
conclusions. This split is due to the fact that the Supreme Court did not directly 
address whether Sorrell raised the level of scrutiny applied from the traditional Cen-
tral Hudson test. Also contributing to the split are the archaic alcohol regulatory 
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 161. See supra Part IV, Section A 
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schemes that most states have in place. The traditional three-tier systems have not 
changed since the 1930s, thus prohibiting them from adapting to modern Court 
trends concerning the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It appears that 
states are still hesitant to depart from their strict tied-house laws that they believe 
stop undue influence in the alcohol industry. 
The Supreme Court did not directly state that Sorrell amended the commercial 
speech standard. However, a comprehensive reading of the opinion would leave a 
reasonable person with the notion that the Court did intend to raise the level of 
scrutiny applied to the four-part Central Hudson test.170 The best fix to the circuit 
split on this issue would be for the Supreme Court to hear a case like Missouri 
Broadcasters or Retail Digital Network and opine whether the traditional Central 
Hudson evaluation should apply or the heightened Central Hudson evaluation.   
While the best outcome would be for the Supreme Court to clarify which stand-
ard is applied to commercial speech restrictions that are content-based, that is wish-
ful thinking. In the meantime, state legislatures located in the jurisdiction of the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals need to be prepared to present clear evidence that 
their regulatory schemes restricting commercial speech further their stated interest. 
In contrast, state legislatures located in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ juris-
diction have less of a burden when enacting these regulatory schemes, and must 




 170. See generally Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 590-91 (implying that there is a different 
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